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The danger inherent in a liberal use of the kidnap laws, as raised in
Levy, has led some states to adopt the rule in Daniels. Since every forcible movement must necessarily begin with some from of assault, the
definition and scope of asportation set out in Adams provides practical
guidelines for distinguishing between kidnapping and other crimes.
Texas, and other states which have a strict asportation requirement in
their statutes, have not been called upon to rule on the scope necessary
60
to commit the offense.
N. E. Maryan

ALIENS-CONSTITUTIONAL

-IN

LAW-MORAL

TURPITUDE-DEPORTATION

THE DETERMINATION OF ALIENS DEPORTABLE UNDER 8 U.S.C.

§ 1251(a) (4) THE

CRIME OF STATUTORY RAPE Is USUALLY CLASSIFIED

As RAPE AND SUCH A CRIME MANIFESTLY INVOLVES MORAL TURPITUDE. Marciano v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 450 F.2d

1022 (8th Cir. 1971).
Roni David Marciano is an alien who was born in Morocco in 1942
and entered the United States on an immigration visa in 1967. He is a
citizen of Morocco and Israel. Marciano was convicted of statutory rape
in violation of Minnesota law' and was sentenced to three years imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed by the Minnesota Supreme
Court. 2 Petitioner, Marciano, contends that his conviction does not
form a basis for deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) because (1) the
phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" is unconstitutionally vague
and violates the due process clause of the fifth amendment; 8 and (2) the
state offense of which the petitioner stands convicted is not a crime involving "moral turpitude" under Minnesota statutes.4 Held-Affirmed.
In the determination of aliens deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)
S.W.2d 254 (rex. Crim. App. 1966), where the defendant sought the name of a prostitute
and the court found this of adequate value to uphold conviction.
60 It is interesting to note that the proposed revision of the Texas Penal Code section
20.01 redefines kidnapping as ". . . intentionally or knowingly ... [detaining] . . . another
for a substantial period, or intentionally or knowingly . . . [moving] . . . another a
substantial distance from the vicinity where he is found, with intent: (1) to hold the other
for ransom or . . . hostage; or (2) to facilitate the commission . . . of a felony; or (3) to
inflict serious bodily injury or death on the victim . . . ; or (4) to terrorize the victim or
another." (Emphasis added.)
1 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.295(4) (Supp. 1971).
2 State v. Marciano, 167 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. 1969).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.295(4) (Supp. 1971). The statute makes sexual relations with a
female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen a crime without proof of criminal intent.
Also, the usual statutory rape defenses of reasonable mistake as to age, previous unchaste
character, and intended marriage are unavailable to the petitioner.
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the crime of statutory rape is usually classified as rape and such a crime
manifestly involves moral turpitude.5
The present law under which the petitioner is being deported is the
descendant of the Immigration Act of 1917.
(a) Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman)
shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be deported who
(4) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after entry and either sentenced to confinement or confined therefor in a prison or corrective institution,
for a year or more ....6
The Immigration Act of 1917 was patterned after earlier immigration
laws 7 which had similar provisions concerning crimes involving moral
turpitude. The statute, which provides for the deportation of aliens who
have committed crimes involving "moral turpitude," has been troublesome to the courts over the years in their attempts to define this elusive
phrase." Equally difficult and intertwined with the first problem has
been the trauma generated concerning the procedurallimitations which
burden the courts in determining the existence of moral turpitude.9
At the congressional hearings which preceded the Immigration Act of
1917, it was mentioned that no one actually knew what constituted
moral turpitude. 10 A widely accepted definition of moral turpitude is
"... an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and man."" A precise definition of moral turpitude has never been es5 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1971). See also
Ng Sui Wing v. United States, 46 F.2d 755, 756 (7th Cir. 1931); Bendel v. Nagle, 17 F.2d
719, 720 (9th Cir. 1927).
6 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1970) (previously enacted as Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19,
39 Stat. 889).
7 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1970) (originally enacted as Immigration Act of 1903, ch. 1012,
§ 2, 32 Stat. 1213, re-enacted as Immigration Act of 1907, ch. 1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898).
8 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 71 S. Ct. 703, 95 L. Ed. 886 (1951); Giglio v. Neelly,
208 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1953); Bendel v. Nagle, 17 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1927); United States
ex rel. Griffo v. McCandless, 28 F.2d 287 (E.D. Pa. 1928); In re Henry, 99 P. 1054 (Idaho
1909).
9 Pino v. Nicolls, 119 F. Supp. 122 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 215 F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1954), rev'd
per curiam on other grounds sub nom., Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901, 75 S. Ct. 576, 99
L. Ed. 1239 (1955). See United States ex rel. Robinson v. Day, 51 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1931);
Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1929); United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210
F. 860 (2d Cir. 1914). Procedurally, the courts cannot look to the particular circumstances
of the crime to determine moral turpitude.
10 Hearings before House Comm. on Immigration & Nat. on H.R. 10384, 64th Cong., Ist
Sess. 8 (1917). (Cited in Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 n.5, 71 S. Ct. 703, 709 n.5,
95 L. Ed. 886, 894 n.5 [1951]). "In 1926 the House Committe on Immigration and Naturalization determined to delete the phrase from the act. But to date Congress has been unable
to agree on changes." 43 HAav. L. REV. 117, 121 n.43 (1929) (citations omitted).
11 In re Henry, 99 P. 1054, 1055 (Idaho 1909); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Russell, 99
S.W.2d 1079, 1084 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1936, writ dism'd); BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY
1160 (4th ed. 1951).
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tablished primarily because the term refers to changing social standards
rather than legal standards. 12 It has been generally agreed that a crime
involving moral turpitude is such an act which grievously offends the
moral code of society even in the absence of a statute prohibiting such
activity.8a
United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl14 is the oldest and probably most
oft cited case on moral turpitude.
[T]he law must be administered upon broad, general lines and if a
crime does not in its essence involve moral turpitude, a person
found guilty of such a crime cannot be excluded because he is
shown, aliunde the record, to be a depraved person.15
In Mylius, for the first time, the procedure was adopted whereby moral
turpitude "must be determined from the judgment of conviction and
not from the testimony adduced at the trial."'u This, and similar cases,
have caused most of the problems in this area of the law because of the
patent uncertainty of moral turpitude and because of the often questioned method of determining the presence of moral turpitude. Mylius
still represents the prevailing view of the United States Courts of Appeals."

Pino v. Nicolls'I represents the minority view and differs from the
majority of the circuits in its classification of crimes which involve moral
turpitude, but echoes Mylius concerning the procedure to be used in
determining moral turpitude.
If the crime in its general nature is one which in common usage
would be classified as a crime involving moral turpitude, neither
the administrative officials in a deportation proceeding nor the
courts on review of administrative action are under the oppressive
burden of taking and considering evidence of the circumstances of
a particular offense so as to determine whether there were extenuating factors which might relieve the offender of the stigma of moral
obliquity.19
12 United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Pa. 1947); 3 AM.
JuR. 2d Aliens and Citizens § 80 (1962).
13 United States v. Carrollo, 30 F. Supp. 3, 6 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
14 United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860 (2d Cir. 1914).
15 ld. at 863 (emphasis added).
l6 Id.at 863.
17 Rassano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 377 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1966); Wadman v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964); Ablett v. Brownell, 240 F.2d 625 (D.C.
Cir. 1957); United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Savoretti, 200 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1952); United
States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1939). "When by its definition it does
not necessarily involve moral turpitude, the alien cannot be deported because in the
particular instance his conduct was immoral." Robinson v. Day, 51 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1931).
18 Pino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237 (st Cir. 1954).
19Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
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Jordan v. De George20 is one of the few cases in this area which has
been heard by the United States Supreme Court. 2' The petitioner in
De George was convicted of conspiring to violate the Internal Revenue
Code by possessing and selling whisky without paying the appropriate
tax. The Court found that the immigration statute in question had a
sufficiently definite meaning to be a constitutional standard for deportation. The strong dissent in De George questions the constitutionality
of the moral turpitude test by illustrating many instances in which
courts have wrestled with the phrase and the inconsistency with which
22
the term is applied.

In Marciano, the court rejected the petitioner's contention that the
term moral turpitude was unconstitutionally vague. 23 The petitioner
next contended that the crime of which he was convicted, statutory
rape, did not involve moral turpitude. 24 The Minnesota statute, which is
controlling in this case, provides:
Whoever has sexual intercourse with a female child under the
age of 18 years and not his spouse may be sentenced as follows: ...
(4) if the child is 16 years of age, but under the age of 18 years and
the offender is 21 years25 of age or older, by imprisonment for not

more than three years.

The statutes further provide that "[c]riminal intent does not require
proof of knowledge of the age of a minor even though age is a material
element in the crime in question." 26 The Minnesota Supreme Court
admitted that the application of MINN. STAT. ANN. 609.02 subd. 9(6)
(1964) "may lead to unjust results," but concluded that Marciano was
27
not such a case.

In the instant case, the question is whether or not a conviction on a
charge of statutory rape usually and manifestly involves moral turpitude
20 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 71 S. Ct. 703, 95 L. Ed. 886 (1951).

21 See also United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 53 S.Ct. 665, 77 L. Ed. 1298
(1933) (petitioner deported for counterfeiting).
22 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 239, 241, 71 S.Ct. 703, 712, 713, 95 L. Ed. 886, 896,
897 (1951).
23 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1024 (8th Cir. 1971), citing
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 71 S. Ct. 703, 95 L. Ed. 886 (1951).
24 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1024 (8th Cir. 1971). See also
Forbes v. Brownell, 149 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.D.C. 1957). "When inquiring into the nature
of a statutory crime, the definitive name, or label, attached to the proscribed conduct is
not the criteria for determining whether such offense involves moral turpitude. The impact
upon moral turpitude, inherent in a conviction under a criminal statute, must be measured
by the language delineating the offense, for therein is found the elements of the crime;
and, from the elements of the offense determination of whether or not moral turpitude is
involved must be made."
25 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.295 (Supp. 1971).
26 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.02 subd. 9(6) (1964).
27 State v. Marciano, 167 N.W.2d 41, 42 (Minn. 1969), citing State v. Morse, 161 N.W.2d
699, 703 (Minn. 1968).
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without a thorough examination of all the circumstances of the case.
The record shows that the petitioner admitted to having intercourse
with the underaged female, knowing fully that she was underage and
that he was the aggressor. This was enough to convict the petitioner and
the record did not indicate anything unusual about the case. 28 The
majority in Marciano concludes that the crime of statutory rape does
not include the element of mens rea29 because of the very nature of the
offense and that as long as the necessary elements of the crime are present to convict under state law then the petitioner is guilty of committing
a crime involving moral turpitude.8 0
The dissent in Marciano questions the "traditional" rule which is
8
followed by the majority of the United States Courts of Appeals. '
Neither immigration officials, nor we, may consider the circumstances under which the crime was in fact committed. When by its
definition it does not necessarily involve moral turpitude, the alien
because in the particular instance his conduct
cannot be deported
82
was immoral.
The aforementioned rule is credited to Mylius and the reason stated for
the rule is one of practical, administrative convenience. "[I]t would be
extremely difficult and time-consuming for the Immigration Service to
examine into the factual context of every conviction sustained by an
alien to see whether moral turpitude was, or was not, present in the
circumstances. - .

." 3

This administrative procedure was designed to

afford uniform protection to the accused and to speed the administrative
84
process, but the results have been anything but consistent.
28 Federal courts have consistently held that statutory rape is a crime involving moral
turpitude. Pino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237, 240 (lst Cir. 1954); Ng Sui Wing v. United States,
46 F.2d 755, 756 (7th Cir. 1931); Bendel v. Nagle, 17 F.2d 719, 720 (9th Cir. 1927).
29 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1971), citing
Matter of Dingena, 11 L. & N. Dec. 723 (1966).
80 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1971). See also
Tutrone v. Shaughnessy, 160 F. Supp. 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). "The essential question in
determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude is whether the proscribed act, as
defined by the law of the state in which it was committed, includes elements which necessarily demonstrate the baseness, vileness, and depravity of the perpetrator."
81 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1026 (8th Cir. 1971), citing
Rassano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 377 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1966); Wadman v. Immigration
& Nat. Serv., 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964); Ablett v. Brownell, 240 F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Savoretti, 200 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1952); United States
ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1939).
82 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1026 (8th Cir. 1971), quoting
Robinson v. Day, 51 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1931).
88 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1027 (8th Cir. 1971).
84 Id. at 1026 n.l. The two could have engaged in the act of intercourse in any one
of twenty-seven states without Marciano being subject to prosecution for "statutory rape."
In any of those states, he would not have committed this crime, and thus Congress' requirements for deportation would not have been met. It is obvious that there is a large
element of happenstance involved in the determination of which aliens are deported and
which are not, and it seems likely that Congress would have preferred a more nearly
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The court in Pino v. Nicolls recognized the inadequacy of the traditional rule in which many criminals were allowed to remain in this
country.35 Some serious crimes could not be said to necessarily and of
their essence involve moral turpitude. Therefore, Pino rejected the traditional rule embodied in Mylius and adopted its own rule that crimes
which common usage would classify as a crime involving moral turpitude need not have their facts considered on appeal.3 6
Both the majority and the dissent in Marciano agreed that the traditional rule of Mylius was defective. The majority adopted the better
reasoned rule as expressed in Pino. The dissent takes issue with Pino's
interpretation of congressional intent in this area indicating that an
alien should be deported when the crime committed involves moral
turpitude, not when that type of crime "commonly" or "usually" involves moral turpitude.8 To illustrate the fallacy of the Pino rule, the
dissent cites the landmark dissent in this area, Tillinghast v. Edmead.8
In Edmead an uneducated, black domestic was deported for petty
theft. In that case Judge Anderson did not feel that the circumstances
warranted the severe punishment of deportation. The judge formulated
several hypotheses to demonstrate the harm that could result from a
procedure that prevented examination of the circumstances; a boy who
steals an apple from an orchard, a mother who steals a bottle of milk
for her hungry child or a foolish college student stealing a sign or a
turkey. Judge Anderson concluded that the logical result of the majority
opinion would render the aforementioned individuals guilty of crimes
involving moral turpitude. 9 Judge Learned Hand hypothesized a
similar situation in which he expressed his belief that it is the result of
natural and normal curiosity for a boy to force his way into a vacant
building, and that it would be pedantic to characterize this act as a
crime inherently involving moral turpitude.40 All of these hypothetical
crimes involve criminal intent and criminal culpability even though
none involve moral turpitude on its face. In the previous examples it
is contended that any deportation without more information as to the
particular circumstances of the crimes would be opposed to the plain
language of the deportation statute. The Marciano dissent further suggests that the test to determine the presence of moral turpitude should
be a question of fact as proposed in Edmead. It maintains that some
uniform treatment of aliens if it had anticipated this disparity in the law's application.
However, this is a matter for the Congress rather than the courts.
35 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1028 (8th Cir. 1971).
86 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1028 (8th Cir. 1971), citing Pino
v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1954).
37 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1028 (8th Cir. 1971).
S8 Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81, 84 (1st Cir. 1929) (dissenting opinion).
89 Id. at 84.
40 United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399, 400 (2d Cir. 1939).
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crimes are of such a character as might or might not involve moral
turpitude and that as to this class the circumstances must be regarded
4
to determine whether or not moral turpitude existed. '
In decisions involving moral turpitude the assumption is often made
that moral turpitude is merely collateral to a finding of criminal culpability. Criminal culpability involves mens rea, but moral turpitude
might not.42 By its definition moral turpitude involves a question of
morals and an act can possibly involve moral turpitude without being
a crime against the state. 43 Since moral turpitude and criminality are
different, Judge Eisele, in the Marciano dissent, suggests that they be
assessed separately. The morals of a nation are constantly shifting, and
it is concededly difficult for44 the administrative agencies to determine
morality at any given time.
In the instant case, the defendant was convicted under Minnesota's
statutory rape statute45 which requires only that an act of intercourse
occur with an underaged girl. There is no provision for the defenses of
previous unchaste character, reasonable mistake as to age, or mistaken
belief of a valid marriage. 46 On the petitioner's appeal, 47 the Minnesota
Supreme Court indicated that some situations might arise in which application of its rules might violate the petitioner's constitutional rights.
This admission by the court indicated that no one can say whether
any of the possible defenses would be allowed in the prosecution of
a case. Presumably, Minnesota relies on the "good judgment of prosecutors and jurors" to avoid an unjust result.48 Consequently, under
a statute similar to the Minnesota Act, no one can reasonably say that
a conviction for a violation of the statutory rape law involves moral
turpitude. A factual investigation into the circumstances of the case
41 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1028 (8th Cir. 1971). See also
Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81, 84 (1st Cir. 1929) (dissenting opinion).
42 Hirsch v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 308 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1962). "A crime that
does not necessarily involve evil intent, such as intent to defraud, is not necessarily a crime
involving moral turpitude." Forbes v. Brownell, 149 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.D.C. 1957). Where
a statutory offense does not include criminal state of mind, equivalent to common law
mens rea, as an essential element, a conviction does not impeach defendant's character or
render him ineligible for admission to the United States.
43 In re Henry, 99 P. 1054, 1055 (Idaho 1909); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1160 (4th ed.
1951).
44 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1029 (8th Cir. 1971) (dissent);
United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1947); 3 AM.
JUR. 2d Aliens & Citizens § 80 (1961). The dissent in Marciano also makes the point that
no matter how difficult it is for the Immigration Service to determine moral turpitude
"considerations of administrative convenience should certainly be secondary to the determination and enforcement of the obvious legislative intent." Marciano v. Immigration & Nat.
Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1029 (8th Cir. 1971).
45 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.295(4) (Supp. 1971).
46 See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. ANN, art. 28-408 (1964) (over 15 years of age and unchaste
character); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1183 (1961) (previous unchaste character of girl over
15 years of age).
47 State v. Marciano, 167 N.W.2d 41, 42 (Minn. 1969).
48 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1030 (8th Cir. 1971), citing State
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would be required to determine whether or not moral turpitude was
49
involved as suggested in Edmead.
The trial court granted a post-conviction evidentiary hearing. From
the hearing and from the statements made in Marciano's guilty plea, it
was determined that Marciano knew the girl's age and that they had
discussed marriage prior to the date of the crime. The girl had been
staying in his apartment, and she had told him that she was pregnant
by another man. The petitioner contends that she left her separate bed
in the early morning hours on the day of the crime, approached him, and
invited him to have relations. 50 The Minnesota courts did not determine
the truth of these statements. The trial court, after the post-conviction
hearing, did find that Marciano was the "aggressor." It seems that
Minnesota must find an "aggressor" and a "victim" in every act of
intercourse with an underaged girl. 51 This is the only indicia of
evidence from the hearing which might indicate that petitioner's crime
involved moral turpitude. Judge Eisele questions the reality of the
"aggressor" rule and maintains that "[w]hen ascertaining the presence
or absence of moral turpitude surrounding an act of consensual intercourse, it is not reasonable to assume that there must be an aggressor and
a victim." 52 The Minnesota courts did not rule that the petitioner's
acts involved moral turpitude, and their decision was not questioned.
The problem is that Congress has entrusted to the Immigration Service,
and ultimately, to the federal courts, the interpretation of the Minnesota conviction.53 The Minnesota finding that the petitioner was
the aggressor does not automatically establish the issue of moral
turpitude in federal court. 54 The Marciano dissent suggests that the
majority determination, that the crime involved moral turpitude, is a
conclusion of law and that the case should be remanded to determine
the essential fact question. 55
In analyzing Marciano, it is obvious that there is a problem nationwide in determining when a crime involves moral turpitude. 56 Difficulties arose initially because of the inherent problems in defining the term
and subsequently, because crimes involving moral turpitude can change
v. Morse, 161 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Minn. 1968).
49 Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81, 84 (lst Cir. 1929).
50 State v. Marciano, 167 N.W.2d 41, 42 (Minn. 1969). By uncontroverted allegations the
girl was sixteen years old and Marciano was twenty-five.
51 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1030 (8th Cir. 1971).
52 Id. at 1030.
53 Id. at 1030.
54 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1031 (8th Cir. 1971).
55 Id. at 1031.
56 See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 71 S. Ct. 703, 95 L. Ed. 886 (1951); Giglio v.
Neelly, 208 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1953); United States v. Francioso, 164 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1947);
United States ex rel. Sollazzo v. Esperdy, 187 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Zgodda v.
Holland, 184 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Vidal y Planas v. Landon, 104 F. Supp. 384
(S.D. Cal. 1952); United States ex rel. Griffo v. McCandless, 28 F. Supp. 287 (E.D. Pa. 1928).
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as the mores of our society change. 57 The courts agree that the best way
to determine whether or not crime involves moral turpitude is to limit
any investigation of the circumstances of the case to the record of conviction. The record includes the indictment or information, the plea,
5
the verdict or judgment, and the sentence. 8
The judicial trend is toward maintaining the split of authority between the majority and the minority methods of determining the
existence of moral turpitude. 59 Beginning with Mylius, the courts devised the traditional, simple test by which the Immigration Service
could determine whether or not aliens should be deported. Any crime
which did not inherently involve moral turpitude would not support
a deportation. This rule was adopted as an administratively convenient
way to effect the wishes of Congress.60 In most cases, such as armed
robbery, murder and forcible rape, the element of moral turpitude is
evident and justice is done while doing the will of Congress. It is only
in the borderline cases that the simple, administrative procedure fails
and blind obedience to its precepts results in injustice. 61 Some opinions,
while citing weighty precedent to the contrary, admit the inequity or
possible inequity of their decisions,6 2 while other cases contain strong
dissents to the injustices.63
The procedural technique proposed by the dissent in Marcianooffers
a solution to this theoretical problem of determining which offenses
involve moral turpitude. It suggests that instead of being tied to a
rigid formula by which moral turpitude is determined, the court should
disregard fixed formulas and examine all of the circumstances of the
case instead. By examining the circumstances the courts can determine
if moral turpitude in fact exists in each case without being bound by
57 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 238, 71 S. Ct. 703, 711, 95 L. Ed. 886, 895 (1951)
(dissent); United States ex tel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Pa.
1947).
58 Wadman v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964); United States
ex rel. Zaffarano v. Corsi, 63 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1933); United States ex el. Teper v. Miller,
87 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); United States ex rel. Griffo v. McCandless, 28 F.2d 287
(E.D. Pa. 1928).
59Wadman v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964); United States
ex rel. McKenzie v. Savoretti, 200 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1952); United States ex rel. Zaffarano
v. Corsi, 63 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1933); United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860 (2d Cir.
1914) (majority).
Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1971); Pino v. Nicolls, 215
F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1954); United States ex rel. Sollazzo v. Esperdy, 285 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.
1960) (minority).
60 Pino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1954); United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210
(2d Cir.
1914);
v. Holland, 184 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
F. 61
860
United
States
ex Zgodda
rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1939); Tillinghast v.
Edmead, 31 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1929); Zgodda v. Holland, 184 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
62 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1971); Zgodda v.
Holland, 184 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Vidal y Planas v. Landon, 104 F. Supp. 384
(S.D. Cal. 1952).
68 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1971); Tillinghast v.
Edmead, 31 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1929).
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which crimes necessarily or generally involve moral turpitude. The plea
that the record standing alone should not be controlling in determining
the existence of moral turpitude is definitely the minority view, but
64
there has been support for this in cases other than Edmead.
On occasion, the courts, while saying that they are confined to the
record, appear to look to the circumstances of the case and make exceptions. In Rassano v. Immigation and Naturalization Seruice, the
court, while paying lip service to the traditional procedure for determining the existence of moral turpitude, remanded its own deportation
verdict for further review and determination at the request of the
defendant alien.6 5 In Vidal y Planas v. Landon the court had enough
circumstantial knowledge of the defendant's situation to hold that his
homicidal act did not involve moral turpitude. 66 In Vidal y Planas the
court justified its decision to exonerate the defendant by quoting the
Solicitor of the Department of Justice wherein he defined some crimes
involving moral turpitude and excepted others. The Solicitor ruled that
some offenses which do not involve moral turpitude are "the outcome
merely of natural passion, of animal spirits, of infirmity of temper, of
weakness of character, or of mistaken principles, unaccompanied by a
vicious motive or corrupt mind."6 7 In United States v. Francioso the
alien requested citizenship, but was challenged by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service because Francioso had been living with his
niece. 68 Judge Learned Hand obtained enough information to determine that incest did not include moral turpitude and the petitioner was
allowed to become a citizen. In Zgodda v. Holland the court deported
the petitioner for petty theft.6 9 These convictions, which occurred
twelve years before the petitioner entered the United States, were
enough to place the case under the "arbitrary" deportation rules. In
Zgodda the court, while acknowledging that the petitioner's thefts
were motivated by privation, said:
Counsel's argument makes a powerful appeal to reason and conscience. It poses the question whether the moral quality of an act
64 Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1030 (8th Cir. 1971) (dissent);
Zgodda v. Holland, 184 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Pa. 1960); United States ex rel. Valenti v.
Karnuth, 1 F. Supp. 370 (N.D.N.Y. 1932); Ciambelli ex rel. Maranci v. Johnson, 12 F.2d
465 (D. Mass. 1926).
65 Rassano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 377 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1966).
66 Vidal y Planas v. Landon, 104 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
67 Id. at 389. Similar reasoning could quite possibly be applied to the case of the
petitioner, Marciano. If all of the circumstances of the crime were known, the court might
have found that, despite the statutory regulations, his crime of statutory rape was the
"outcome of natural passion" to which the taint of moral turpitude did not attach.
68 Cf. United States v. Francioso, 164 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1947). This case resembles the
instant case in that both involve moral relationships which were "statutorily" condemned.
69 Zgodda v. Holland, 184 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Pa. 1960). The thefts which resulted in
conviction occurred in Germany in the aftermath of World War II when petitioner was
only a young girl.
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can be assessed apart from the impact of attendant circumstances.
Unfortunately for this petitioner, the question is not an open one.
free, as we understand the law, to go
We regret that we are 7not
0
back of the convictions.
The recurring theme in the examples above and throughout the area
of moral turpitudes and aliens is that a great deal of injustice has been
done by the courts in their arbitrary method of determining moral
turpitude. 71 The injustice is not entirely one-sided. Aliens have been
freed who should have been deported due to the quirks in the administration of the immigration laws. 72 The situation as it exists today is
inequitable because the appellate courts receive more circumstantial
information about some cases than others, 73 and some courts are more
reluctant than others to utilize the information at their disposal to do
equity. 74 A modification of the rules to allow the courts to study the
circumstances of Marciano and similar cases would produce more
equitable results for the United States and for the respective aliens.
Intelligent and just decisions can only be made where all available
facts and circumstances of the particular case are made known to the
court.

Jeptha C. Tatum
70 Id. at 851.
71 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 233, 71 S. Ct. 703, 708, 95 L. Ed. 886, 893 (1951)
(dissent).
72 See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 239 n.13, 71 S. Ct. 703, 712 n.13, 95 L. Ed. 886,
896 n.13 (1951).
How unguiding the guide "moral turpitude" is, in relation to the enforcement of
the Act of 1917, can be shown by three pairs of cases:
(1) In Tillinghast v. Edmead (citations omitted), the First Circuit over a pungent
dissent, held that a conviction for petty larceny by an "ignorant colored girl" working as
a domestic was an offense involving "moral turpitude." On the other hand, in United
States v. Uhl (citations omitted), the Second Circuit held that conviction for possession
of a jimmy, with intent to use it in the commission of some crime, the jimmy being
"adapted, designed and commonly used for the commission of the crimes of burglary
and larceny" was not for an offense involving "moral turpitude."
(2) In United States v. Day (citations omitted), Judge Knox held that an assault
in the second degree, though by one intoxicated, constituted a crime involving "moral
turpitude." But in United States v. Zimmerman (citations omitted), Judge Mais held
that jail breaking by a bank-robber awaiting trial was not an offense involving "moral
turpitude."
(3) In Rousseau v. Weedin (citations omitted), the Ninth Circuit held that one who
was convicted of being a "jointist" under a Washington statute prohibiting "the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor" was deportable as having committed a crime involving "moral turpitude." While in Hampton v. Wong Ging (citations omitted), it
held (with the same judges sitting in both cases) that a conviction under the Narcotic
Act was not of itself a crime of "moral turpitude," since the record did not show
whether the offense for which conviction was had was "of such an aggravated character
as to involve moral turpitude."
78 Hirsch v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 308 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1962). The record contained
no indictment, therefore, the petitioner could not be deported for the crime of knowingly
making false statements to a federal agency. In Ciambelli ex tel. Maranci v. Johnson, 12
F.2d 465 (D. Mass. 1926) an assault and battery on a police officer was held not to involve
moral turpitude where the allegations of the indictment did not warrant a finding of
moral turpitude.
74 See Zgodda v. Holland, 184 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
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